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Brogaard, Berit, Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of 
Propositions, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. ix + 195, £45 
(hardback). 
 
The exact subject matter of this book might strike some readers with surprise, 
given its subtitle, as many aspects of the metaphysics of propositions receive 
almost no attention. Certainly, there is little here for those who take 
metaphysics to predominantly concern issues of ontology, where perplexing 
questions as to the nature of propositions that we might find in classic debates 
about, for example, realist versus anti-realist accounts of propositions, go 
almost entirely unexamined. Instead, in her Introduction, Brogaard (p. 5, fn. 1) 
explicitly states she does not intend to defend a particular account of what 
propositions are; preferring to stipulate that propositions are just whatever fills 
any of the conceptual roles commonly associated with propositions. I think 
there are problems that arise from this lack of engagement over the 
connection between ontological status and conceptual role that I shall return 
to later but, returning to the matter at hand, the focus of Brogaard’s book 
should instead be seen primarily as being about the contents of propositions.  
 
This focus might strike some as being more akin to the philosophy of 
language than to metaphysics. However, Brogaard has a very particular 
angle: to defend temporalism as the theory that can best account for 
propositional contents. Temporalism is perhaps best understood as the 
position directly opposed to the more orthodox view of eternalism, advocated 
by Frege and many others, that the contents of beliefs, assertions, etc. are 
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propositions that have their truth value eternally. By contrast, temporalism 
allows for propositional content that can change truth value over time, a view 
famously associated with Prior. The book is arranged so that a defence of 
temporal content as propositional content can be levied in a way that supports 
the requirements demanded by the major conceptual roles for propositions 
(semantic values of truth-evaluable sentences, objects of the attitudes, etc.). 
The result is a detailed, often technical, and certainly ambitious account as to 
how temporalism can counter the many criticisms eternalists have levelled 
against it.  
 
Brogaard opens in chapter 1 with a brief characterization of temporalism in 
terms of fulfilling the demands of the first conceptual role we often require 
propositions to play; that of being the semantic value of truth-evaluable 
sentences. This starts with the basic Fregean position that all propositions 
have their truth-value eternally and cannot have different truth values at 
different times. Sentences without explicit time determination can only 
express a proposition (gedanken or thought) when the time of their utterance 
is taken into account, for example, the sentence ‘This tree is covered with 
green leaves’ can only express a complete proposition with the context of its 
utterance is taken into account, so if it was uttered at 3pm on 6th June 2013 
then it expresses the proposition that this tree is covered with green leaves at 
3pm on 6th June 2013. Temporalism, by contrast, is the view that propositions 
may vary in truth-value over time, so that the proposition expressed (relative 
to a context of use) by the sentence ‘This tree is covered with green leaves’, 
may be true in June and false in December. It is important to note that 
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temporalism is not the claim that all propositions are temporal, as there are 
still plenty of propositions that we recognise must have their truth-value 
eternally, such as those which do contain specific time adverbials, or those we 
take to be necessarily true (for example, that 4 is greater than 2), etc. Rather, 
it is the view that some propositional contents are temporal. Brogaard then 
argues that eternalism and temporalism, despite these differences, share the 
same metalinguistic truth conditions where there is no embedding within the 
scope of a propositional attitude verb.  
 
This leads Brogaard to defend temporalism against the many objections to it 
that are based on the role of propositions as the object of attitude reports, 
such as belief. The specific focus for chapter 2 is Mark Richard’s case against 
temporalism based on the obvious invalidity of certain arguments involving 
belief claims that would turn out to be valid under temporalism, for example: 
 
(P1) Mary believed that Nixon was president 
(P2) Mary still believes everything she once believed 
Therefore 
(C) Mary believes that Nixon is president.  
 
According to Richard, the temporalist must regard this as valid because 
temporalism regards the objects of belief to be temporally neutral rather than 
specified (as the eternalist does).  
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The defence Brogaard offers in light of these objections is to develop an 
account of belief retention – how we continue to believe the same proposition 
over time. This starts with the counter-criticism of eternalism that we would 
never be able to retain a sufficiently accurate memory of the fully-indexical 
and temporal content of a proposition as the eternalist would conceive of it. 
Instead, Brogaard offers an unusual means by which a temporalist can retain 
beliefs: by standing in a belief relation to a proposition appropriately related to 
the original object proposition but which does not actually have to be the 
same proposition. Although this gives the temporalist a means of denying the 
validity of arguments such as those raised by Richard, it seems to rest on a 
confusion between a referent and a cognitive ability to remember accurately 
that referent. The objects of our beliefs still might be eternal propositions with 
all their concomitant temporal contents and it is to those we refer through the 
medium of our hazy memories. Accounting for the possibility of such 
confusion would have greatly aided the force of Brogaard’s argument.  
 
Much of the rest of the book (chapters 4-7) is devoted to reviving and applying 
Prior’s theory of tense operators as a viable alternative to quantificational 
theories as a means of accounting for verb tense and other linguistic 
concerns. This starts in chapter 4 with a defence of an operator account of 
tenses as being able to explain the empirical linguistic problems presented 
against it by Jeffrey King, reasons which King viewed as motivating a shift 
towards the quantifier approach and away from the early burgeoning attempt 
at using tense operators. These concerns revolve around the fear that 
predicate logic with sentential operators would require an incredibly complex 
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tense logic to account for our use of tense in English. Brogaard’s response is 
to outline how a simple Priorian tense logic can be just as elegant a treatment 
of tenses and temporal expressions as that offered by quantificational 
theories. Note that Brogaard’s argument seems to aim at temporalism offering 
an account that functions as well as – but not significantly better than – the 
quantificational treatment, thereby providing us with an alternative but failing 
to give additional reason to prefer that treatment. Chapter 5 continues with a 
more general defence of this application of Prior’s tense logic. This is seen as 
important for Brogaard’s overall thesis – that accounting for tenses in English 
is vital for the success of temporalism because one of the main conceptual 
roles identified for propositions at the beginning of the book was that they act 
as the contents that intensional (modal or tense) operators operate on.  
 
Chapter 6 takes as its starting point Kaplan’s arguments that the contents of 
sentences can change their truth-value across time, so that there are indeed 
tense operators in English which must therefore operate on temporal 
propositions, and initiates a defence of this position against eternalist 
objections that sentences have two kinds of content – temporal and eternal – 
of which only eternal content can be called propositional. Finally, in chapter 7, 
given that Brogaard claims to have shown how temporal propositions can play 
all the roles traditionally associated with eternal propositions, some account of 
those seemingly unequivocally eternal propositions is offered. This includes, 
for example, those expressed by present-tense sentences with time 
adverbials, such as “I am in England at 3pm on 6th June 2013”, as well as 
those without time adverbials, such as “Socrates exists”. According to 
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Brogaard, this latter kind can express two kinds of content – temporal and 
eternal – relative to a context of use. As temporalism only requires that some 
propositions are temporal, the existence of some eternal propositions is not 
seen as problematic for this position.  
 
I cannot do justice here to the detail Brogaard puts into her revitalisation of 
Prior’s tense operator theory and her attempts to meet each major 
counterexample levelled against temporalism. Although this is unquestioningly 
a highly accomplished treatment of the temporal contents of propositions, 
there remains a concerning lack of engagement as to the connection between 
the ontological status of propositions and the conceptual role or roles they are 
meant to play. The various traditional conceptual roles for propositions that 
Brogaard attributes to Frege (the semantic values of truth-evaluable 
sentences, the objects of the attitudes, the objects of 
agreement/disagreement, etc.) are only guaranteed to be roles that are 
played by the same entity because of Frege’s reliance on thoughts as abstract 
objects, existing as eternal propositions in something akin to a Platonic realm. 
Whilst Brogaard claims that all these roles can be fulfilled by her account of 
temporal propositions, the question remains as to whether there could be 
propositions of this kind. Brogaard gives no genuine account of how these 
roles might connect together on a temporalist reading.  
 
This problem might be mitigated somewhat by appeal to what Brogaard calls 
a “minimalist view of propositions” (p. 6). Although she does not explicitly 
state what this consists in, it is implicitly characterized as the view that we 
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require only a certain number of these conceptual roles to be fulfilled in order 
to classify the role-player as a proposition. Clearly, it is easier to establish an 
account where only some, rather than all, of these role constraints are met. 
However, the concern is that by identifying a multiplicity of conceptual roles 
and engaging in talk of ‘minimalist’ accounts of propositions, we are back in 
the realm of ontological commitment and this is exactly what Brogaard does 
not talk about. Hence, it is not clear that we are dealing with a sui generis 
object that can play all these roles or a number of different objects that each 
play one or more of these roles. At best, Brogaard’s account tells us that if 
there are propositions then they can plausibly be considered to have temporal 
contents. That doesn’t tell us whether there are such temporal propositions. 
Moreover, if an eternalist conception of propositions can fulfil these role 
constraints and also give us some form of ontological account, adopting 
temporalism without these underpinnings seems less enticing.  
 
Despite these concerns, as an attempt to revive Prior’s theory, this is by far 
the most thorough and compelling account I have read and certainly provides 
us with good reason to re-assess the temporal content of propositions.  
 
 
Anthony Wrigley 
Keele University 
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